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is with the raw abuse of power by a police officer.., and not with
simple negligence on the part of a policeman or any other official."-' The
decision to reject section 1983 claims based on simple negligence is not an
irrational line drawing. Assuming that the purpose of the statute is punitive and corrective, as well as compensatory, 28 courts are not unreasonable to require that the defendant should have intended to do the act
resulting in the deprivation-or at least to have behaved so recklessly or
arbitrarily that the courts will view his actions with the same level of indignation heretofore reserved for intentional deprivations. Simple negligence, even when resulting in the deprivation of constitutional rights,
does not carry the same weight of culpability.
The Jenkiw decision turns heavily on the factual situation. The court
does not suggest a 'eddily apparent standard for the type of conduct now
required for a section 1983 action, other than "gross or culpable negligence"-a particularly imprecise concept. One suspects that the decision
is a visceral one-more emotional than objective.2 Its utility in future
litigation will depend upon how readily a future court is shocked by the
circumstances of the case then before it.
ELMER LISTON BISHOP, III
...

Constitutional Law-Exemption of Church Property From Taxation
Since the birth of the nation, Congress and the states have afforded
religious organizations a favored status under tax legislation.' An important example of that benevolence is the universal practice of exempting
from ad valorem taxation property owned by religious organizations and
u§ed exclusively for religious purposes. 2 Walz v. Tax Commission of City
27Id.

at 1232.

'8 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170-87 (1961).
' Notice, for example, the considerable space Judge Sobeloff gives to recounting
the rather remarkable testimony given at the trial. 424 F.2d at 1230-31.
'See, e.g., Stimson, The Exemption of Churches from Taxation, 18 TAXES 361
(4940); Zollman, Tax Exemptions of American Church Property, 14 Micir. L.
Rzv. 646 (1916); Note, Constitutionality of the Real Property Church Exemption,
3.6 BRooKLYN L. Rnv. 430 (1970).
'A representative provision is N.C. CoxsT. art. 5, § 5. State constitutional and
statutory provisions for the property tax exemptions are collected in Van Alstyne,
Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 461 (1959); Note, The
Establishment Dilemma: Exemption of Religio sly Used Property, 4 SUFFOLx L.
REV. 533 (1970).
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of New York3 has resolved the much debated issue4. of whether such exemptions necessarily violate the establishment clause of the first amendment. 5
They do not. This note examines Walz in terms of its relation to the
precedent under the establishment clause, and the impact the decision may
have upon the future of that clause.
Appellant Walze sought to enjoin the exemption from ad valorem taxes
of property owned by religious organizations and used solely for religious
worship, arguing that the exemptions indirectly required him to make
a contribution to religious groups. In New York, exemptions for such
property, as well as for a broad class of property including nonprofit
educational and charitable facilities, are required by a statute implementing a provision of the state constitution.8
It is hardly surprising that the Court upheld the New York exemptiofi.
Twice before, the Court had been presented the issue 'on appeals from
state court decisions sustaining religious exemptions and had dismissed for
want of a substantial federal question.' No prior Court decisions holding
The pecuniary importance of the property exemption is illustrated by the fact

that the exempted church property in New York City is valued at 692,000,000

dollars. The revenue gained from taxation of that property at the prevailing fiscal
1969 rate would have been 35,000,000 dollars. N.Y. Times, June 17, 1969, at 1,
col. 6.
- 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
'E.g., Kauper, The Constitutionality of Tax Exemptions for Religiom Activities, in THE WALL BETwEEN CHURCH AND STATE 95 (D. Oaks ed. 1963); Bittker,
Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285 (1969).
'U.S. CONsT. amend. I provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...."
6
Itis possible that Walz bought his twenty-two by twenty-nine foot Staten
Island lot, valued at one hundred dollars and on which the annual property tax is
five dollars and twenty-four cents, to qualify as a taxpayer having standing to bring
the suit. N.Y. Times, June 20, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
The statute provides in pertinent part:
Real property owned by a corporation or association organized exclusively for the moral or mental improvement of men and women, or for
religious, bible, tract, charitable, benevolent, missionary, hospital, infirmary,
educational, public playground, scientific, literary, bar association, medical
society, library, patriotic, historical or cemetery purposes . . .and used
exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes ...
shall be exempt fom taxation as provided in this section.
N.Y.
REAL. PROP. TAX LAW §420(1) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
8 N.Y. CoxsT. art. 16, § 1.
'General Fin. Corp. v. Archetto, 93 R.I. 392, 176 A.2d 73 (1961), appeal
dismissed, 369 U.S. 423 (1962); Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644,
298 P.2d. 1, appeal dismissed sub nom., Heisey v. County of Alameda, 352 U.S

921 (1956).
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legislation unconstitutional were in point. New York had not singled out
churches for special treatment, but had included them in a broad class of
exemptees. 1° The historical fact of long practice weighed heavily in favor
of a constitutional interpretation sustaining the exemption. Possibly, the
Court was not unmindful of the vituperative public reaction that followed
the school prayer cases" and wished to avoid a similar spectacle. Although
the decision could be viewed as virtually "preordained," it is nevertheless significant, for in reaching its result the Court rejected some of the
earlier establishment clause reasoning, and at the same time retained,
expanded, and fashioned some anew.
2
the Court transformed the estabIn Everson v. Board of Education4

lishment clause from an apparition into a reality when it applied that
clause to the states through the fourteenth amendment and yet upheld the
practice of reimbursing parents for the costs of transporting their children
to public and nonprofit private schools, including sectarian schools. In
Everson the Court made the classic statement of the establishment clause
limitations:
oSee note 7 supra. The breadth and character of the groups afforded preferred
treatment could be especially important factual variants. Problems of statutory
construction are thoroughly discussed in Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church
Property, 20 OHio ST. L.J. 461 (1959).
Of particular interest are the issues of whether the courts may and in what
manner they should or must define the term "religious" in the exemption statutes.
See Rabin, When is a Religiouis Belief Religious: United States v. Seeger and
the Scope of Free Exercise, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 231 (1966); Comment, Defining
Religion: Of God, the Constitution, and the D.A.R., 32 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 533
(1965); Note, Qualifying for State and Federal Religions Statutory Exemptions,
1969 U. ILL. L.F. 249.
Must a group whose avowed tenets are atheistic but which otherwise has the
characteristics of a church be numbered among the "religious" exemptees? The
majority in Walz did not speak to the problem. In his concurring opinion in Walv,
justice Harlan assumed that the New York statute did extend the exemption to
such groups and therefore satisfied the requirement of government neutrality
between religion and nonreligion. 397 U.S. at 697. justice Douglas, the lone
dissenter in Wale, felt that the statute did not include such groups, resulting in aid
to organized believers but denying it to non-believers, whether organized or not,
in violation of governmental neutrality. 397 U.S. at 700. Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333 (1970), and Seeger v. United States, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), may have
revealed the Court's general approach to this issue. Those cases involved construction of the term "religious training and belief" in the statutory provision for
exemption of conscientious objectors from combatant service in the Universal
Military Training and Service Act § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. APP. 456(j) (1964).
11 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel
infra. For an account of the public
-. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). See p.
reaction to those decisions see Kurland, The School Prayer Cases, in Tnz WALL
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 142 (D. Oaks ed. 1963).
18330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another.... No tax in any
amount, large or small, can -belevied to support any religious activities
or institutions, whatever they may be called ....Is
Thus the Court settled the long-standing debate over whether the establishment clause was intended to proscribe only governmental preference of one
religion over another, or governmental advancement of all religions as
well, and couched its interpretation of the clause in absolute language.
In keeping with the strict "no aid to religion" principle, the watchwords
of early establishment cases were "separation of church and state."1 In
later cases the Court recognized, and in Walz it strongly reiterated, that
this constitutional goal of separation cannot mean absence of all contact, 5
and the absolute "no aid" principle was abandoned-properly so, it would
seem, since such an approach had proved unsuitable in other areas of
constitutional law. 16
Board of Education of Abington Township v. Schempp'7 marked a
significant step in the evolution of establishment clause standards. In
Schempp the Court held that a state may not require readings of Bible
verses or recitation of the Lord's Prayer in public schools and restated the
establishment clause test as follows:
[W]hat [is] the purpose and primary effect of the enactment? If either
is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds
the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution.
That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment
18

Id. at 15-16.
1,Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) ; Everson v.Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947).
at 676.
"8r 397
E.g.,U.S.
in Ogden
v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827), all but one of
the Justices agreed that the contract clause, "No State shall... pass any... Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts," U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §10, imposed an
absolute ban. See Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pt. 1), 57
H.Av.L. Rnv. 512, 533 (1944). Thereafter, in some cases, the Court engaged in
the dubious enterprise of creating state contract law and reading implied conditions
into contracts in order to uphold some statutes and yet preserve this absolute principle. Id. (pt. 3), 852, 872-73. This awkward position was abandoned, and the
modern view puts it "beyond question that the prohibition is not an absolute one
and is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula." City of
El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508 (1965).
" 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion.18
Under the Schempp test, the validity of legislation turned on mere formthe manner in which aid to religion came about, rather than the magnitude
of the aid. In Wag, the Court did not adopt the Schempp test,"0 and once
again one may find striking parallels in other areas of constitutional law
in which distinctions based on form were ultimately rejected.2"
In some establishment cases the Court had relied on the secularization
of religious institutions to sustain governmental advancement of them.2 '
"Blue laws" requiring Sunday closing were upheld upon the Court's finding that although they were originally enacted to serve religion, the
prevailing modem use of Sunday justified their continuance to advance
the secular state goal of providing a day of recreation and respite from
labor. 22 In Walz the Court specifically rejected a similar justification of
23
the exemption based on performance of secular social services by churches.
In Everson, while admitting that reimbursing parents for the transportation costs helped children get to sectarian schools, the majority of
Id. at 222.
The Schempp test was adopted in substantially the same form and applied in
the establishment cases decided by the Court after Schernpp and before Wala. See
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (a state may not prohibit the teaching
in the public schools of the theory that man evolved from lower orders of life, at
least when it is clear that the purpose of the statute is to prevent contradiction
of the traditional Biblical account of man's creation); Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968) (a state may "lend" secular textbooks to children attending
sectarian schools).
20
E.g., Congressional power under the commerce clause to regulate intrastate
activities was once held not to extend to those activities having only an indirect
effect on interstate commerce. The Court's view was that "[t]he distinction between a direct and an indirect effect turns, not upon the magnitude of either the
cause or the effect, but entirely upon the manner in which the effect has been
brought about," and that "[i]t is quite true that rules of law are sometimes qualified
by considerations of degree .... [b]ut the matter of degree has no bearing upon
the question here .... ." Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936). That
view was later rejected; "questions of the power of Congress are not to be decided
by reference to any formula which would give controlling force to nomenclature such
as.. 'indirect' and foreclose consideration of the actual effect of the activity .... "
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942). Now such an activity may be regiflated "if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce," regardless
of whether that effect is direct or indirect or how local in nature the activity is.
Id. SE.g.,
at 125. if sectarian
school education had not become secularized, the reimbursement of transportation costs in Everson would have taken on the quality of providing
transportation to church services.
2 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-45 (1961).
28 397 U.S. at 674.
19
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five was careful to characterize the aid as being to parents rather than to
church schools.4 In Board of Educationv. Allen,2 the Court applied the
Schempp "purpose and effect" test to uphold the practice of lending textbooks to sectarian school children on "formal request" by the children.
The books were chosen by the sectarian schools and approved by public
school authorities. In Allen, the Court insisted that "[no] books are
furnished to parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to parents
and children, not to schools." 2 Walz recharacterized Everson and Allen
and cited their facts in support of its result; the Everson transportation
costs and the Allen books were said surely to have constituted "aid" to
the sponsoring churches, and, in the Allen case, relieved "those churches
of an enormous aggregate cost for those books. ' '27 Building on this view,
the Court failed to see how the "broader range of police and fire protection given equally to all churches, along with nonprofit hospitals, art
galleries, and libraries . . .

is different for purposes of the Religion

Clauses."2 8

Thus it is clear that the Court will not invalidate legislation
for the sole reason that it results in very substantial aid to religion, and,
accordingly, the Court no longer feels compelled to cover up the fact of
that substantial aid by calling it something else.
The Court retained only the skeleton of the establishment clause test
that existed prior to Walz. In initially defining the limits of governmental power, the Court stated that "[e]ach value judgment under the
Religion Clauses must... turn on whether particular acts in question are
intended to establish or interfere with religious beliefs and practices or have
the effect of doing so."" This broad and general guideline does not, without more, add significantly to precise consideration of establishment issues,
since in that regard it merely begs the question. However, it is noteworthy that the Court framed this test in terms of the "Religion Clauses."
Discussion on the relationship of the establishment and free exercise clauses
is scarce in earlier opinons, but the opinion in Walz is replete with references to that relationship" and at least indicates that the Court has begun
to consider the clauses together.
2,330 U.S. at 18.
--392 U.S. 236 (1968).
2

11Id. at 243-44.

U.S. at 671-72.
21397
2
-8Id. at 671.
"Old. at 669.

'oE.g., "The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Re-

ligion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if
expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other." Id. at 668-69.
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When the Court applied the "purpose" phase of the test, it found that
the purpose of the exemption was neither advancement nor inhibition
of religion. Instead, the purpose was said to be simply to spare a broad
class of nonprofit organizations, including religious groups, that "foster the
moral or mental improvement" of and are beneficial and stabilizing influences in the community from the burden of taxation levied upon private
profit institutions. 1
In applying the "effect" phase of the test, the Court stated it to be
"inescapably one of degree." Past decisions have indicated that the establishment clause test is properly one of degree,82 although that theme was
not then developed. Adoption of a degree test seems entirely appropriate,
especially when it has proved workable in other areas of constitutional
law. 33 Yet after determining that an excessive degree of something
is impermissible, the question remains, of what? In Walz, the Court
answered, "excessive governmental entanglement with religion."3 4 Indeed, "entanglement" and "involvement" appear to have become new
watchwords.
The Court analyzed the exemption issue by comparing the exemption
with the alternative of taxation. Exemption, although resulting in an
indirect economic benefit, was said to occasion far less "involvement"
by avoiding tax valuation of church property, tax liens, and so forth;
furthermore, exemption was not viewed as sponsorship since the state does
not transfer part of its funds to the church. Unfortunately, the Court's
analysis on this point is obscure. The sort of involvement avoided by the
exemption could hardly lead to an establishment of religion; even disregarding the financial burden, the inconvenience to the church caused by
the taxation process is much more relevant to the free exercise clatuse. Of
course, the free exercise clause can limit the operation of the establish1Id. at 672.
While specifically declining to justify the exemption because of the secular
services performed by churches, the Court accepted the New York legislative determination that along with the other exemptees, religious organizations qua religious
organizations contribute to the secular goals of fostering the "moral or mental improvement" and stabilization of the community. Thus it appears that for the first
time in an establishment case the Court has given specific recognition to what Professor Giannella has called a "secularly relevant religious factor," and seems to accept
the notion that the advancement of religion per se always advances some permissible
secular goals to some extent. See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishlmnt,
and Doctrinal Development, 81 HARv. L. Rnv. 513, 528 (1968).
" E.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
" See note 20 supra.
3'397 U.S. at 674.
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ment clause, and has freequently been held to require government to create
special exceptions in favor of religion. 35 It is possible and seems probable, that, although it did not specifically so state, the Court was enaging
in a balancing of the interference with the "free exercise" of religion
that would result from taxation against whatever "establishment" or
advancement results from exemption. 6
It is also possible that the Court has embraced quantitative minimization of church-state involvement3 7 as an independent factor in the
establishment clause or religion clauses test. It appears from the Walz
opinion that a statute conditioning tax exemption on performance of
secular services by the church would not find favor with the Court. 8s Of
course, performance of such services would be a burden on the church,
and the imposition of that burden could conceivably run afoul of the
free exercise clause. However, the Court's position seems to be that even
if the burden of performance was negligible, the application of such a
statute to churches would nevertheless be unconstitutional solely because
of the church-state involvement precipitated. It is true that such a statute
would visit some slight burden on the church due to the inconvenience
of documented conformity, but the Court leaves unclear whether it is this
consideration or the mere fact of the involvement, the church-state con"E.g., in Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944), the Court held that a
town could not impose its license fee for the selling of books on a Jehovah's
Witness minister for whom the selling of religious literature was a religious exercise and source of living income.
" In other parts of the opinion, the Court did talk in terms of the "Religion
Clauses." See note 30 supra. The Court did say that the exemption tends to
complement and reinforce the desired separation, but did not clarify whether it is
the operation of the free exercise clause that makes the separation desirable in this
instance. 397 U.S. at 676.
"' The phrase "quantitative minimization of church-state involvement" is intended to denote diminution of church-state intercourse and entanglement of the
state in activities of the church without regard to its quality, kind, effect, etc. An
extreme and absurd example would be denial of police and fire protection to the
church because of the "involvement" occasioned by affording the protection.
"The Court found it not only unnecessary but also undesirable to justify the
exemption on the social welfare service performed by churches. In the Court's
words,
[t]o give emphasis to so variable an aspect of the work of religious bodies
would introduce an element of governmental evaluation and standards as
to the worth of particular social welfare programs, thus producing a kind of
continuing day-to-day relationship which the policy of neutrality seeks to
avoid. Hence, the use of a social welfare yardstick as a significant element
to qualify for tax exemption could conceivably rise to confrontations that
could escalate to constitutional dimensions.
397 U.S. at 674.
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tact, that could require condemnation of the statute. Minimization of
church-state involvement and entanglement is properly an independent
consideration, since even neutral involvement, in which the church is
treated neither favorably nor unfavorably because it is the church, may
be so direct or intense as to draw the church into the political arena and
invite strife and "political division on religious lines."8 Hopefully, however, the Court is not unwittingly heading towards a reversion culminating
with quantitative minimization of church-state involvement as the controlling factor. The Court has already rejected quantitative maximization
of separation of church and state as the only constitutional goal, 40 and
should similarly limit the role of this, its obverse.
The "purpose" element of the test seems open to question. A legislative
purpose to advance religion is in some instances easily concealed, especially
in the tax field. Professor Bittker has pointed out that taxation statutes
can be drafted so as to avoid positive exemptions and therefore the use
of such words as "religion" as a basis for classification. 41 Other potential
problems with the examination of legislative purpose are illustrated by
Zorach v. Clauson,42 in which the Court sustained the practice of releasing
children from public schools on parental request to attend religious instruction classes without the school grounds. School attendance was otherwise compulsory; those children not leaving the school for religious instruction were required to remain at the school. The Court declared this
program to be a permissible state accommodation of its public school
schedule to religious activities.43 If faced with the Zorack facts again,
although the "effect" of the program is clearly the advancement of religion,
the Court could simply hold that it is not such to an unconstitutional
degree. But who could deny that the "purpose" of the program is the
establishment of religion, or at least the advancement of religion? If the
Zorach result were to be reached again, it would appear that the Court
would either have to strike the purpose inquiry from the test or fashion
some sort of degree scale for determining permissible legislative purpose.
" "[P]olitical division on religious lines is one of the principal evils that the
first amendment sought to forestall." Freund, Public Aid to ParochialSchools, 82
HAv. L. REv. 1680, 1692 (1969). In his concurring opinion in Wale, Justice
Harlan adopted and applied the factor of minimization of church-state involvement
as the third element in a tripartite test also imposing "voluntarism" and "neutrality"
requirements. 397 U.S. at 695.
40

See p. 345 supra.

'1 Bittker, Churches, Taxes, and the Constitution, 78
(1969).
42343 U.S. 306 (1952).
,8 Id. at 315.

YALE

L.J. 1285, 1293
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Perhaps the best means of obviation of these difficulties is also the
simplest-elimination of the purpose inquiry. After all, one wonders why
even the most fastidious atheist would object to a statute, the admitted
purpose of which is the establishment of an official religion, but which is
wholly ineffectual to accomplish that result.
Since the Court did not summarily dispose of the exemption issue
as it apparently could have," it would seem that it considered Walz to be
an appropriate vehicle for definitive exposition of its views on the establishment clause. Walz does indicate that the Court will use the free exercise
clause and a degree test to limit the operation of the establishment clause,
especially when the "aid," albeit substantial, is afforded equally to all
religions. Adoption of a degree test was an appropriate step towards more
refined consideration of establishment issues, but the unfortunate use of
church-state "involvement" per se, without clarification, as the measure of the validity of the exemption has not contributed to that goal,
and it still remains for the Court to do what it has already said the first
amendment does with respect to church-state relations-"studiously [define] the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or
45
union or dependency one on the other.
R. B.

TUCKER, JR.

Criminal Procedure-Application of the Doctrine of Collateral
Estoppel to State Criminal Prosecutions
In Ashe v. Swenson' the Supreme Court has constitutionally required a
variation of the civil law doctrine of collateral estoppel for state criminal
trials.' The Court defined collateral estoppel as the principle that "when
an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final
judgment, that issue cannot be litigated between the same parties in any
"See p. - & note 9 supra.
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
1

397 U.S. 436 (1970).

estoppel, as required in criminal cases is distinguishable in two
ways from that traditionally applied in the civil law. First, the requirement of
mutuality-that a party cannot benefit from the doctrine unless he would be bound
by it if the opposite result had been reached-is not carried over into the criminal
law. Second, the general verdict of a criminal trial requires some speculation as
to its basis that the special verdict of the civil trial often does not. For a good discussion of the problems of mutuality and the general verdict see Note, Collateral
Estoppel in Crimilal Cases, 28 U. GCEi. L. R v. 142 (1960).
2Collateral

